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I. INTRODUCTION
It seemed apparent to me that "the law's favorite creature,"' a
"reasonable man," did not include women. I needed only to look
at the historical role of women in the law to arrive at that conclu-
sion. However, my statement to that effect during a discussion in
my Feminist Legal Theory class met opposition, so I stopped to
think about it.
Several weeks later, the idea that the language of the law ex-
cluded women surfaced again. The first time was in Legislation class,
while reading Commonwealth v. Welosky, 2 where the court decided
that "in using the word person in statutes concerning jurors and
* Legal Services Staff Attorney, Appalachian Research and Defense Fund; J.D., West Virginia
University, 1988.
This article had its origins as a paper for Marie Ashe's Feminist Legal Theory seminar at the
West Virginia University College of Law. The author is deeply indebted to her for the opportunity
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1. West Virginia Public Employees Ins. Bd. v. Blue Cross, 328 S.E.2d 356, 361 (W. Va. 1985).
2. Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 177 N.E. 656 (1931).
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jury lists [the legislature] confined its meaning to men."' The second
time I noticed the exclusion was in the Feminist Legal Theory class
discussion on Roe v. Wade,4 when a comment was made regarding
Blackmun's introduction to the history of abortion using "man's
attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the centuries." 5 The
speaker felt that her attitudes as a woman were not included in
Blackmun's opinion and that, in this context, man did not also mean
woman.
These experiences reinforced my belief. Common usage illus-
trated that "man" did not include the female sex, and judicial decree
made clear that "person" did not include women. I decided to in-
vestigate this language of the law that excluded women. As a starting
point, I set out to find law's "reasonable woman." In search of
this elusive character, I found much more than I anticipated. In-
cluded in my findings were an unyielding gender bias among male
practitioners of the law; an interweaving of two patriarchal insti-
tutions, language and law; and a considerable body of feminist the-
ory on both subjects.
Trekking through these amassed works, I sometimes wandered
in the jungle of conflicting theories, frequently struggled through
the swamp of intellectual verbiage, periodically rested on a plateau
of momentary insight and finally came within reach of the peaks
of syntheses and understanding. As I prepare to narrate my travels,
I realize that, while my quest was not in vain, I still have only a
glimmer of law's reasonable woman. While I am not ready to give
up seeing her realized, I now feel the task is one of creation rather
than discovery. As a result, the assignment I have undertaken is to
explain her absence and to investigate the resources available to fa-
cilitate inclusion of women in the language of the law. To set the
stage for my discussion of sexism and language, I will first provide
a historical look at the absence of women in the language of the
law by relating the results of a computer-assisted search for the
reasonable woman in court decisions. I will then discuss the im-
3. Id. at 406, 177 N.E. at 660.
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. Id. at 117.
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portance of language in social organization, and characterize the
impact on women of sex differentiation and sexism in language,
especially in legal writing. Finally, I will elucidate the deeper concern
of feminist theorists regarding women's silence, alienation, and op-
pression. My conclusion is founded upon a feminism that embraces
a commitment to change and a denial of the validity of man-made
modes of thinking. I agree with Catherine MacKinnon when she
says: "Feminism comprehends that what counts as truth is produced
in the interest of those with power to shape reality and that this
process is as pervasive, as it is necessary, as it is changeable. ' 6
II. THE SEARCH FOR THE REASONABLE WOMAN IN THE LAW
In all that mass of authority there is no single mention of the reasonable woman.
7
I began my search for the reasonable woman in the dictionary,
Black's Law Dictionary. I found what I suspected I might find:
nothing!! There is no entry for "woman." There is one for "man."
He is defined as:
A human being. A person of the male sex. A male of the human species above
the age of puberty. In its most extended sense the term includes not only the
adult male sex of the human species but women and children.8
Thus, a basic premise of the law appears to be that it is unnecessary
to recognize the existence of women. Acknowledgement as a sub-
category of man is deemed sufficient in the basic legal reference
book.
Both satisfied and dissatisfied with this discovery, I went to Lexis
for a search of court decisions in hopes of finding not just a woman
but a "reasonable woman." I framed the query to get any case that
used reasonable (with a universal ending) within two words of wom*n
(I used this spelling so the computer would search woman or women).
I found nothing in a search of United States Supreme Court de-
cisions. I reached a similar result in a search of West Virginia Su-
preme Court cases. A search of all the federal courts finally revealed
6. C. MAcKNNON, FEMINISM, MARXISM, METHOD AND THE STATE 637 (1983).
7. PROSSER, TORTS (4th ed. 1971) (quoting A. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON
LAw 12-16 (1930)).
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTioNARY 865 (5th ed. 1979).
1988]
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six cases which used the term "reasonable woman." I anxiously set
out to see what the law would say about her.
In 1917, a young widow challenged an ante-nuptial agreement
in which she exchanged her dower rights and all other rights in her
fifty year-old husband's estate for $50,000. In finding the agreement
valid, the court said that a "reasonable woman" with full knowledge
of a $250,000 estate would have accepted the settlement, which se-
cured a comfortable support for her life, over the uncertainty of
claiming the whole estate. 9 From the holding in this case, it appears
that reasonable women are concerned about security and would will-
ingly exchange their legal rights for financial support.
It was not until 1969 that the courts again felt compelled to
discuss the reasonable woman. In United States v. Articles Con-
sisting of 216 Bottles,0 the federal Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) confiscated a beauty product called Sudden Change which
was advertised as "a face lift with out surgery."" Based solely on
this claim by the advertisers, the FDA found the product to be a
drug rather than a cosmetic. As a result, the product had to be
tested and approved before it could be marketed.
The district court, disagreeing with the FDA's determination,
reasoned that "constant exposure to puffing and extravagant claims"
had induced "some immunity to the beautifier's hyperbole." Given
this fact, the district court could not believe that the "potential buyer
expected anything other than the possibility that she may look
better."
On appeal, the circuit court agreed with the FDA's determination
and overturned the district court decision. In making its determi-
nation that the FDA was correct in its efforts to protect the "ig-
norant, unthinking and credulous," the circuit court derided "the
standard the court below applied . . . which appears to assume
something like a 'reasonable woman' standard.' ' 2 By rejecting a
9. Suchor v. Gooch, 244 F. 361 (4th Cir. 1917).
10. United States v. An Article, 409 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1969).
11. Id. at 737.
12. Id. at 741.
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reasonable woman standard, the appeals court implied that women
are ignorant, unthinking and credulous.13 (It is easier to understand
now why she is so interested in security!)
The reasonable woman appeared again in the mid-seventies in a
medical malpractice suit entitled Bowers v. Garfield,14 where a hys-
terectomy was performed. In this case, the court inquired as to what
the objective standard required of a reasonable woman in the plain-
tiff's situation might be. Finally, I thought, the courts are beginning
to recognize that reasonable women exist. Upon reflection, however,
I could not help but wonder what standard was used in the hundreds
of other cases involving medical malpractice on women patients.
In 1983, the reasonable woman (bracketed in quotes with no
reference to the source quoted) appeared in a criminal case, United
States v. Ciammitti.15 On appeal, she asserted a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1309, which generally provides that any officer may break into a
house to execute a search warrant if, after notice of his authority
and purpose, he is refused admittance.
In upholding the conviction, the appeals court dismissed the dis-
sent's concern that it was "unreasonable to expect Nora Ciammitti,"
"or any reasonable woman," "with four children sleeping in their
bedrooms to have left the family room at 12:15 in the morning to
open the front door in half a minute.' 16 In this case, the dissent
recognized the concerns of a reasonable woman. The majority, how-
ever, not only dismissed these concerns but denigrated the concept
by bracketing the term reasonable woman,1 7 thereby suggesting that
it is an unnatural construction in legal writing, perhaps even an
oxymoron.
Finally, two more cases came up on the computer screen. Both
were 1986 sex discrimination cases and came from the same federal
district of western Michigan.
13. Id.
14. Bower v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
15. United States v. Ciammitti, 720 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1983).
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Two hundred years of federal court decisions, sixty-six years since
the 19th amendment, twenty years since Second Wave Feminists
raised the issue of sex discrimination in the law and in the language,
and still "reasonable women" are found only infrequently in court
decisions, and then in dicta. I agree with Adrienne Rich that "this
is no semantic game or trivial accident of language."' 8
The following quotation from Adrienne Rich, in which I sub-
stitute "law" for "education," lays a foundation for the issues pre-
sented in this paper and suggests that language itself trivializes,
insults, and excludes women:
What we have at present is a man centered [legal] system, a breeding ground
not of justice but of masculine privilege. As women have gradually and reluctantly
been admitted into the mainstream of the [law] they have been made participants
in a system that prepares men to take up the roles of power in a man-centered
society, that asks questions and teaches "facts" generated by a male intellectual
tradition, and that both subtly and openly confirms men as the leaders and shapers
of human destiny both within and outside the [law]. The exceptional women who
have emerged from this system and who hold distinguished positions in it are
just that: the required exception used by every system to justify and maintain
itself. That all this is somehow "natural" and reasonable is still an unconscious
assumption even of many who grant that women's role in society is changing and
that it needs to change .... ,9
Just because men and women are sitting in the same classroom, hearing the
same lectures, preparing the same briefs; they are not receiving an equal education.
They are not because the content of [law] itself validates men even as it invalidates
women. Its very message is that men have been the shapers and thinkers of the
[law] and that this is only natural. The bias of the [law] is white and male, racist
and sexist; and this bias is expressed in both subtle and blatant ways.3°
III. Tim IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
Until we understand the assumption in which we are drenched, we cannot know
ourselves.2'
It has been said that the most distinctly human quality we can
possess is the ability to communicate with each other by means of
language. There is almost no aspect of our lives that is not touched
18. A. RICH, ON Lms, SEcRErs AND SMENCE 127 (1979).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 241.
21. Id. at 35.
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by language. We live in and by language. Language is unquestion-
ably a powerful force. From the biblical story of Babel, wherein
God destroyed the unity of human language, to Orwell's 1984, in
which language is seen as a perverted tool of oppression, this power
has been recognized.22 The question of language and its political
implications has absorbed writers and philosophers throughout his-
tory. In modern times language also has attracted the attention of
scientists, and a whole field of scientific inquiry called linguistics
has developed.
Language is accepted as crucial to the organization of human
society. Thus, feminists concern themselves with language because
it is seen as an instrument used to maintain male power.23 Early
feminist activity towards language sought to eliminate negative and
stereotypical portrayals of women by advocating "non-sexist writ-
ing." A usage was seen as needing reform if it was either blatantly
offensive or implied that humanity was male. Reform consisted of
recasting expressions to make them neutral.24
Recently, however, a new kind of concern with language has
become more common among feminists. Some theorists warn that
non-sexist language is an illusion. They stress that language is per-
vaded by sexism and that women are alienated from it because it
is controlled by men.25 Male dominance is seen as systemic and heg-
emonic. As a result, there is a growing sense that language itself
cannot guarantee communication.
Over and over, women express a feeling of inhibition because
of the inadequacy of words. 26 Deborah Cameron, in Feminism and
Linguistic Theory, describes "alienation from language as an uneasy
feeling that your words are not yours at all, they have been taken
away and turned against you." 27 Catherine MacKinnon, in Femi-
nism, Marxism, Method and the State, describes the feminist theory
22. D. C.immRO, FEamIsm A"D LmmnSTXc THEoRY 1 (1985).
23. See id. at 3.
24. Id. at 4.
25. Id.
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of knowledge as inextricably tied to the feminist critique of power
because the male point of view forces itself upon the world as its
way of apprehending it.28
Paulo Friere, the revolutionary Brazilian educator, while devel-
oping a literacy program for the poor of Recife in the early 1960's,
recognized the connections between language, politics, and con-
sciousness. By linking literacy to critical consciousness, his program
became an effort to liberate the people and not simply an instrument
to dominate them. For Friere, a critical consciousness is an inten-
tionality towards the world. It does not merely reflect the world or
reality. Rather, a critical consciousness transforms reality by acting
upon it. Friere's work recognizes the way language forms our per-
ceptions of the world and our intentions toward it.29 Adrienne Rich,
the feminist poet, recognizes, as Friere does, "the sense that lan-
guage is power . . . that those who suffer most from injustice are
the least able to articulate their suffering." 0
The relationship between language and world view has fostered
among feminists the development of and debate about theories of
language which address the silence, alienation and oppression women
experience. Three areas of investigation have been identified by pro-
ponents of language theory. First, there is the study of sex differ-
ence: do men and women use language differently, and, if so, what
does this mean? Second, the examination of sexism in language, its
effects, and ways to eliminate it continue. Finally, this investigation
looks at women's alienation and asks if this is the "oppressor's
language" within which we cannot articulate our experience as
women.'
IV. SEx DIFFERENCE IN LANGUAGE
The fear is not that we are different, the fear is that we are the same. 2
It is not surprising that sex differences have been found in lan-
guage. What is interesting is that many feminists, including feminist
28. C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM, MARXISM, METHOD AND THE STATE (1983).
29. R. MAclim, LITERAcy & REVOLUTION, THE PEDAGOGY OF PAULO FRIERE 2 (1981).
30. A. RICH, supra note 18, at 67.
31. D. CAMERON, supra note 22, at 6, 7.
32. R. MORGAN, THE ANATOMY OF FREEDOM (1982).
[Vol. 91
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linguists, have expended more energy in studying sex difference in
language rather than in criticizing it. 3 While feminists recognize the
political dimension that the study of sex difference in any subject
has and point out that many sex difference studies are simply elab-
orate justifications of female subordination or overt anti-woman
propaganda, 34 there are now feminists who acclaim language dif-
ferences as an expression of "woman's voice."
In a survey of studies carried out by feminist linguists, Deborah
Cameron found two primary motives for studying sex differences.
The first is to identify and legitimize a female mode of language
use and to relate such language to the general notion of female
culture. The second motive relates to the identification of the sexual
power dynamic in language use, with the point being that even our
speech behavior reflects and perpetuates patriarchal norms.35
One problem easily identified with linguistic studies of speech
difference (whether misogynist or feminist) is the problem of ster-
eotypes in language. The tendency to stereotype has been given the
name "folk linguistics." The term refers to that collection of beliefs
about language which is accepted as common sense within a society.
These beliefs serve both to regulate the linguistic behavior and to
explain it to the ordinary language user. Some of them are fairly
accurate; some are quite false. However, false stereotypes tend to
persist as long as they reinforce important social inequalities. As
long as women are subordinated to men, their language must be
characterized as indicating natural subservience, a lack of intelligence
and immaturity.
36
The reliance on stereotypes in linguistic studies is but one crit-
icism of sex difference studies. Other criticisms target the meth-
odology used to carry out such studies. The favored method is a
comparative one in which the speech (or writing) patterns of the
group being studied are described in terms of how they differ from
the norm. The assumption, of course, is that white, middle-class
33. D. CAMERON, supra note 22 at 29.
34. See id. at 28.
35. D. CAMERON, supra note 33.
36. D. CAIERON, supra note 22, at 31-33.
1988]
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male speech or writing patterns are the norm. As a result, the ex-
periences of women (or ethnic groups or classes) are treated as de-
viations from the norm.37 This methodology is also subject to criticism
because researchers notoriously find what they set out to find. Thus,
if they are looking for difference, that is what they will find. More
important is the fact that researchers feel the need to explain how
the non-standard deviates from the norm (white/male) but not vice-
versa.38
The interpretations of the data from these norm-deviation studies
comprise the crucial problem in the politics of sex difference. Cul-
tural stereotypes, rather than the nature of the phenomenon, de-
termine the interpretations of linguistic difference. It is irrelevant to
focus on whether the sex difference is natural or cultural if the
explanation of the result fosters sex discrimination.39
Lynn Schect Hefron, in How Stereotypes About Women Influ-
ence Judges,40 cites a study by the Duke University Law and Lan-
guage Project which found that a style of speech characterized by
questioning intonations, hedges, and overly polite forms is used far
more often by women than by men. This speech style was found
to be more effective than an abrupt and commanding style in in-
terpersonal relationships but was also found to be a less credible
style in the courtroom. The difference in speech style scrutinized in
this study is perceived as affecting women's performance in the
courtroom. It is difficult, however, to relate this perception to the
actual variation. Linguistic sex differences act simply as badges of
femaleness and are valued negatively, irrespective of their substance.
Explaining that rising intonations are learned, or can be credible,
will have no effect on the irrational processes by which everything
female is devalued whether it reflects women's behavior or not. If
men used questioning intonations and hedges, abrupt speech would
be said to be less credible. The point is that in our culture anything
that marks a speaker out as female becomes a cause for complaint
and proof of inferiority.
37. See id. at 45.
38. Id. at 45.
39. See id. at 53-55.
40. Hefron, How Sterotypes About Women Influence Judges, 24 JunoEs J. Issue 1, at 12 (1985).
[Vol. 91
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V. SEXISM IN LANGUAGE
I am saying that sexism and the English Language are unrelated. Between male
and female the language is neutral.4
A noticeable change has occurred in attitudes about language in
the past twenty years. Many people who would never have thought
about the matter just a few years ago now believe in the existence
of sexist and non-sexist language and expressions. Such awareness
has come about largely because of pressure from the women's move-
ment.
Of course, many institutions and individuals continue to use sex-
ist language and to defend its use. However, it is now harder to
deny that male bias exists. Nevertheless, sexist language is defended
on the grounds that one should not tamper with grammar, that non-
sexist forms are aesthetically inferior, or that proscribing language
is something external and independent from the user.
Feminists who attack sex bias are scolded as foolish for wasting
their time on grammar when equality for women is such a great
cause. Women are told that it does not really matter. Obviously,
however, it does matter to women. The litany of means by which
English trivializes, insults and excludes women is familiar. The force
with which formidable scholars, from the linguistics faculty at Har-
vard University42 to the American Bar Association, protest the use
of non-sexist terminology indicates that the issue is threatening.
Last year, the ABA Journal came to the defense of legal writers
who had been challenged as sexist when it published an article by
Irving Younger which asserted that "the English language is sex
neutral. 43 Lawyers were exhorted to stand their ground against sug-
gested changes in the use of male pronouns as a generic (including
both male and female) term. Younger explained that "we who assert
a professional competence to think, speak and write clearly about
complicated things. . . need a language undiminished, flexible, and
41. Younger, The English Language is Sex-Neutral, 72 A.B.A. J., June 1, 1986, at 89.
42. D. CAzMERON, supra note 22, at 66.
43. Younger, supra note 41.
19881
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precise, qualities preserved only when we obey the rules by which
the language works."44
The use of the masculine generic pronoun and Younger's defense
of its use are excellent examples of linguistic sexual inequity and
sex bias being used in defense of sexism. In English, when reference
is made individually to members of a sexually mixed group, the
recognized solution is to resolve the indecision as to pronoun choice
in favor of the masculine. The masculine is deemed "unmarked"
or "neutral" and used to refer to both men and women, while the
feminine is "marked." "Correct" usage, therefore, is sex-specific. 45
Younger's article suggested five justifications for legal writers to
use when they were challenged as sexist in their use of marked/
unmarked pronouns. Younger's "defenses" echo a familiar refrain:
usage is a quirk of language, not a tool of oppression; it is a lin-
guistic rather than a political phenomenon; there are no adequate
substitutes; language develops slowly, so we must leave it alone; and,
because we have rules of usage, we must not violate them. 46
Casey Miller and Kate Swift, in The Handbook of Non-sexist
Writing, prove wrong most of Younger's arguments by tracing the
history of the so-called generic "he." 47 Deborah Cameron also found
that those who would like to maintain the myth of masculine nouns
as words of general reference were relying on popular belief, not
on linguistic evidence. 48
Miller and Swift found no statement by early English gram-
marians that masculine pronouns are sex-inclusive when used in gen-
eral reference. 49 The generic "he" was a late arrival in English, an
invention of the grammarians themselves in an attempt to eliminate
"they" as a singular pronoun, as in the invocation from Shakes-
peare, "God send everyone their heart's desire." 50 In order to achieve
44. Id.
45. See D. CAMERON, supra note 42.
46. Younger, supra note 41.
47. C. MILLER & K. SWiFT, THE HANDBOOK OF NoN-SaIsT WRTiNOs (1980).
48. D. CAMERON, supra note 22, at 50.
49. C. MILLER & K. Swwr, supra noti 47, at 35-36.
50. Id. at 36.
[Vol. 91
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the important syntactical feature of agreement in number with a
singular antecedent, grammarians dismissed as unimportant a lack
of agreement in gender with a feminine antecedent. In 1850, an act
of the English Parliament gave official sanction to the recently in-
vented concept of the generic "he." Similar language in contracts
and other legal documents helped reinforce this grammatical edict
in all English speaking countries.51 So much for a "quirk of the
language" and a "linguistic phenomenon which develops slowly."
Miller and Swift go on to point out that current usage dem-
onstrates the inability of "he" to serve as a generic referent. This
fact has been demonstrated in several systematic investigations of
how people of both sexes use and understand personal pronouns.
The studies confirm that in spoken usage, from the speech of young
children to the conversation of university professors, "'he' is rarely
intended or understood to include she." '52 On the contrary, at all
levels of education people whose native tongue is English seem to
know that "he," "him," and "his" are gender-specific and cannot
do the double duty asked of them.
5 3
This failure of masculine gender pronouns to represent everyone
becomes clear when the referent of the pronoun is likely to be a
woman. For example, "she" is employed in generalizations when
referring to secretaries, nurses, or preschool teachers.5 4 Theoretically,
"he" should always work, but the inclination to switch to "she"
in some cases demonstrates that the masculine gender pronoun is
felt to be either inadequate or inappropriate. Why? Because, gram-
marians to the contrary, "he" brings a male image to mind and
does so whether doctors, lawyers, editors, or acrobats are the sub-
ject. Like generic "man," generic "he" fosters the misconception
that there exists a "standard human being" and that "being" is a
male.
55
While it is relatively simple to illuminate the ways in which Eng-
lish insults, excludes, and trivalizes women, and to describe the pa-
51. Id.
52. Id. at 37.
53. Id. at 37-44.
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triarchal institutions and individuals that advocate continued sexist
usage, it is much more difficult to address the question of whether
we can eliminate sexist language through linguistic reform. Most
feminists believe that sexist language is a bad thing, but this belief
manifests itself in very different approaches to reform. Some con-
sider language symptomatic and see sexist language as a manifes-
tation of patriarchal society. These feminists believe that by pointing
out the prejudices reform can proceed. Others support the idea that
language causes women's oppression rather than being a symptom
of it.
The targets of the reformist/symptomatic camp include generic
masculine pronouns, sex-differentiated job descriptions, and the use
of the word "girl" when referring to adult women. The causal group
has expanded the parameters of what constitutes sexism in language,
insisting that all words are sexist because their meanings are fixed
by and for men and because they all embody male misogyny. 56
The question of whether linguistic sexism is a cause or an effect
of women's oppression and the problem of defining the boundaries
of sexist language ultimately link up with the linguists' debate on
language and reality. That is, the question of who controls language
and who is alienated from itA. Non-sexist language which reformers
envision excludes neither women nor men. The process of making
language non-sexist involves recasting words and sentences so that
all terminology is neutral. The feminist response to sexist language
is to refuse to tolerate its continued use. However, many feminists
feel a need to go beyond theoretical reform and develop a more
sophisticated analysis of the place of language in culture and, thus,
in the oppression of women.
VI. SiLENcE, ALiENATION AND OPPRESSION
Power constructs the appearance of reality by silencing the voices of the powerless,
by excluding them from access to authoritative discourse.,8
56. See, D. CAMERON, supra note 22, at 75.
57. Id.
58. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights & Speech, 20 HAgv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 3 (1985).
[Vol. 91
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For radical feminist theorists there is no neutral language; the
entire system is permeated by sexism throughout. Moreover, they
perceive male language as a species of Orwellian thought control,
for these theorists believe that it is through. language that we con-
struct our reality. Those who define the limits of language can make
us see things their way.
Different approaches to this radical theory have been expounded.
All of them, however, subscribe to some degree of linguistic de-
terminism. Thus, each approach adheres to the fundamental idea
that men control language and women are alienated from it. In fact,
since it determines reality, language may actually alienate women
from the female experience because it fails to encode that experi-
ence. 9
I will not attempt to explain the very exciting fields of critical
theory, semiotics, and post-structuralism that form the framework
of feminist linguistic theory. I will, however, try to illuminate the
underlying theses and the arguments put forth to undermine them.
My basic understanding comes from Cameron, Feminist and Lin-
guistic Theory.60
Linguistic determination, the idea that language determines per-
ception and thus defines reality, assumes that people actively and
selectively choose among the millions of stimuli that impinge on
them at any moment in order to make sense of the world.61 The
question then becomes: what part does language play in this inter-
preting/classifying process? Two possibilities are suggested. The first
possibility is that language is simply a tool to be used, a servant of
thought. If this is the case, there is no great pro6lem about language.
It reflects social conditions and can change in response to social
change. The second possibility is that language channels our thoughts
into ready-made classifications and, thereby, acts like a straight jacket
into which thoughts must fit. 62 Feminists and other progressives tend
to embrace the second possibility.63
59. D. CA1,mRON, supra note 22, at 93.
60. See generally D. CAMERON, supra note 22.
61. Id. at 93.
62. Id. at 94.
63. Id. at 95.
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Several arguments have been made to undermine this thesis.
Foremost is a belief in the universality of language as presented by
Chomsky. If all languages are at bottom very similar because all
speakers have the same mental apparatus, it becomes awkward to
explain how the undeniably diverse perceptions of different com-
munities are determined by language. The ability to learn a second
language and the fact that language users can and do modify their
language are also arguments against linguistic determinism. 64
The second assumption of feminist theories of language is con-
trol. The belief is that the deterministic powers of language can be
and are exploited by the privileged group which controls language. 65
This suggests not only that powerful groups appropriate language,
but that by doing so they are also able to exert subliminal control
over their subordinates to maintain their own power. In Man Made
Language, Dale Spender asserts the view that, through their control
over meaning, men are able to impose on everyone their own world
view. The result of this imposition is that women either are left
without the ability to symbolize male reality (alienation) or are un-
able to speak at all (silence). 66
This view grants extraordinary power and control to language.
The critics of this theory find fault with the belief that reality can
be reduced to language. Determinists presume that oppression and
suffering are mere words. In reality, such a presumption tends to
invalidate women's true experiences in the world and tends to un-
dervalue their everyday communications. It also opens another door
for misogynist descriptions of female inadequacy. Without an anal-
ysis of power, lingulistic theories of control can be used to disad-
vantage women.
Determination and control are the foundation on which feminist
theories of women's silence, alienation and oppression are built. In
as much as these theories emphasize the difficulties women have in
talking about their experiences, they have opened the door to a
greater understanding of the nature and power of language in con-
64. Id. at 99, 100.
65. Id. at 100.
66. See generally SPENDER, MAN MADE LANGUAGE (1980).
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trolling women's lives. However, the point at which such theories
stress the lack of authenticity of women's language, without an in-
quiry into the underlying power relationship, is the point at which
they become a theoretical hall of mirrors from which there is no
escape.
Recognizing that women's lives are constrained by the language
they use to describe reality is not the same as succumbing to an all-
powerful determinant. Recognizing that male dominance of the lan-
guage silences and alienates women is not the same as accepting
oppression. To do so is to confuse the myth with the power that
justifies it.
Women do not resort to silence or counterfeit expressions of their
experience because it is impossible for them to do otherwise. Rather,
they elect to use modes of expression that men can understand be-
cause that is the best way of getting men to listen. It is not impossible
for women to encode their experience, but to do so is socially un-
productive and politically inexpedient. 67 The problem is not one of
language, but one of power.
A recognition of the imbalance of power between men and women
focuses attention on the nature of the oppression. Oppression, like
language, is constructed by and for human beings and is not im-
mutable. It is this notion that appears to be lost in determinist the-,
ories. As Brittan and Maynard suggest in Sexism, Racism and
Oppression, the oppressor's power may seem so overpowering that
the oppressed find conformity unavoidable and abandon any at-
tempts of rebellion. 6
To succumb to the principle of determinism is to accept the prop-
osition that oppression is so complete that intentionality and pur-
posefulness are reduced to nothing. For feminists to adopt this
perspective in order to explain how language silences, alienates, and
oppresses us is to renounce the feminist thesis that the personal is
political, which implies the possibility of conflict, struggle and change.
67. D. CAMERON, supra note 22, at 112-13.
68. See generally A. BRirTAN & M. MAYNARD, SEXISM, RACiSM AND OPPRESSION (1984).
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That language is a resource of the powerful and a tool of op-
pression cannot be doubted. However, to explain oppression on the
basis of the kind of language people use implicitly encourages op-
pression. Such explanations do not require anyone in a privileged
position to change or give up anything. Friere reminds us that the
interests of the oppressors lie in changing the consciousness of the
oppressed, not the situation that oppresses them. The more the op-
pressed can be led to adapt to the situation, the more easily they
can be dominated.
69
Thus, feminist linguistic theory must go beyond simply drawing
connections between language and consciousness and between lan-
guage and oppression. It must suggest a linguistic practice that con-
fronts the idea that we are inevitably controlled by language.
VII. INCLUDING WOMEN IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW
I don't think ladies should be lawyers. I believe that you should be at home
raising a family.
70
From a feminist viewpoint, the law reinforces the prevailing or-
der. The legal perspective, despite its facade of neutrality and ob-
jectivity, is defined by the male perspective. Moreover, the law carries
the authority of the state and, thus, has the power to make man's
point of view synonymous with reality. The example given earlier
of Parliament's edict on the use of "he" as a generic term illustrates
this power as it applies to language. This recognition of the law's
actual power suggests that a change in the law would rectify the
inequities arising from a male-dominated language and legal order.
If it was the law that instituted the generic "he," then the law can
be used to institute sex-neutral usage. "Reasonable women" would
thus make their appearance in court decisions.
The earlier quote from Adrienne Rich, stating that the content
of the law validates men as it invalidates women in both subtle and
blatant ways, illustrates the reasons that edicts of law will not bring
69. R. MAcKiE, supra note 29, at 54.
70. Remark made by Circuit Court Judge Arthur Cieslik to an attorney appearing at a pre-
trial conference, July 1986.
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about the necessary changes in language or the law. Roberto Unger,
in Law and Modern Society, also questions the capability of the law
to serve as a means of change: "[The law] . . . though sufficiently
vital to help legitimate the social order may never become strong
enough to help transform it."1'7 This is not to suggest that the law
is any more determinative than language. The point is that language
and the law are inextricably entwined as powerful male institutions.
For change to come about, we must confront the language of the
law both at the theoretical level and in our everyday practice. Fem-
inism suggests both the theory and the practice for erasing sexism
from the language of the law. Like the "critical consciousness" re-
quired to transform the lives of Latin American peasants in Friere's
work, feminist "consciousness-raising" requires not merely reflec-
tion but change through action. The feminist acceptance of the ne-
cessity of change, not just in the world but in one's self, combines
a self-reflection which negates the male perspective of women's ex-
perience as invalid and a recognition of the exigency of action to-
wards change. David Cole, writing in the Harvard Women's Law
Journal, describes the validity of this course:
To abolish an established social institution which is deeply rooted in the interests
of some social class will require more than a change in the form of consciousness
of the oppressed; it will require a long course of political action. Until that course
of action has been brought to successful completion, the institution will continue
to exert its baleful influence on even enlightened agents, restricting their freedom
and frustrating their desires.-
The feminist linguists provide the necessary tools for analyzing
our linguistic practice and for understanding the nature of male
domination of language. However, it is through self-reflective action
that women will transform the language of the law. This action will
involve changing the identity of the speakers of the language, the
content of what is related, and the descriptive terminology used.
When women become the speakers, describing women's reality with
their own expressions, a female way of apprehending the law will
71. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocrFy 213 (1976).
72. Cole, Getting There, Reflections on Trashing From Feminist Jurisprudence and Critical
Theory, 8 HARV. WoMEN's L. J. 59 (1986) (quoting R. GuEss, THE IDEA OF A CRIrIcAL LEGAL THEORY
HABEPMAS AND Tm FRANKFuRT SCHOOL 72, 74-75 (1981)).
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become intrinsic to the idea of how the law works and what justice
means.
Sally Anne Payton, Professor of Law at Michigan University
School of Law, in an address to a 1984 Women and Law Confer-
ence, suggested that one way to change the language of the law was
to change the identity of the people telling the stories. 73 She also
implied that this would change the view of law as being built on
male-identified qualities such as aggression, rationality, and au-
thority.7 4 Her identification of female-identified traits such as in-
tuition, perception, feeling and judgment as being equally important
affirms the contention that male-identification is both the cause and
the result of male dominance of the law. 75
Her description of the authority of common law decision-making
illuminates the falsity of the notion that the law consists only of
inherently male-identified characteristics.
It is the kind of authority that does not speak until it is asked to speak. It is
thus essentially passive. It is an authority that does not control what it will speak
about, but is required to speak about everything brought to it, if only to decide
that it will not speak. It is thus receptive. It is an authority that is required to
listen before speaking, and its speech, when it comes, is required to be informed
by what it has heard. It is thus expected to be understanding. Finally it is an
authority that has at its own command no instrument of force to carry out its
will, but rather must rely on the executive offices of government to enforce the
law. It is thus institutionally dependent. Passive, receptive, understanding, de-
pendent .... 76
Self-reflection requires a challenge to the view of law as nec-
essarily a male domain. The presence (in increasing numbers) of
women in the legal profession will facilitate a change in the identity
of the story teller, but, in order to change the identity of the in-
stitution from male dominated, women must also change the content
of the stories brought to the law.
73. Address by Sally Anne Payton, Professor of Law at Michigan University School of Law,
at the Women and Law Conference (1984).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Payton, Releasing Excellence: Erasing Gender Zoning From The Legal Mind, 18 IND. L.
REv. 629, 735 (1985).
[Vol. 91
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss1/5
SEXISM, LANGUAGE, AND LAW
As the kinds of cases (stories) brought before the courts change,
as the law is forced to think about new disputes raising new issues,
the legal institution will change.
If there is a single factor that contributed more than any other to the explosion
of legal change in the 1960's and 70's it was that people had never been heard
from before, ethnic minorities, patients, clinics, consumers, welfare recipients,
prisoners, women, and school children gained access to [the courts.]"
Efforts like those of Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon in
American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut help to change not only
the stories the law hears, but also the very language it hears.78
It is also true that not just the subject of the story but the de-
scriptive terminology must change to alter the language of the law.
Julia Penelope, in Language and Transformation of Consciousness,
describes how language reveals our conceptual framework. She rec-
ommends that we learn to hear ourselves as we speak, to monitor
our language use as we describe events and individuals. 79 By iden-
tifying the descriptions that promote male-identified behaviors and
ways of thinking, it will be possible to eliminate such language from
our usage.80
As a first step, Penelope suggests eliminating certain metaphors
such as "Argument is War." 81 By accepting the identity relationship
of this metaphorical concept, we think of arguments as inherently
violent conflicts. The process of arguing and debating different per-
spectives is thus perceived as a war. Our legal system is built around
this concept. The meanings of "plaintiff" and "defendant" ex-
emplify this metaphor in the legal context.82 Plaintiffs are those who
prosecute an action. The term defendant implies an attitude of de-
fense; such persons need only stand and repel the assaults of the
adversary.83
77. Id. at 641.
78. American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), aff'd,
771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986).
79. Penelope, Language and Transformation of Consciousness, 4 L. & INEQUALITY; A. J. OF
THEORY & PRACTIcE 379, 383 (1986).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 385.
82. Id. (quoting McFadin v. Sims, 309 Mo. 312, 328, 273 S.W. 1050, 1053 (1925)).
83. Penelope, supra note 79, at 385 (quoting Henderson v. Applegate, 203 S.W.2d 548, 552
(Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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Penelope suggests that the conception "Argument is Dance"
would create a very different system. Instead of conceiving ourselves
as combatants or enemies, we would be partners working together
to create an artistic and pleasant event. We would not argue to win
but to create from the different points of view an integrated com-
position.84
By rethinking the largely unconscious ways in which language
reflects and perpetuates patriarchal values, we can act to change the
way we perceive the law and ourselves as participants in the legal
system. The process of finding new metaphors and different de-
scriptive terminology will help us reshape not only what we think
but how we think.
As women become the speakers of the law by bringing their
concerns, previously unheard, before legal tribunals and by using
expressions of their reality to describe these concerns, a change in
the language of the law becomes possible. The "reasonable woman,"
missing from the law for so long, is beginning to emerge as a cre-
ation of the self-reflective action of women.
VIII. A SHORT STORY IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW
Vivienne Rabidue was the office manager and credit manager at
Osceola Refining Company, rising from the ranks to become the
only salaried woman on the staff.85 Her duties included supervising
other Osceola employees and maintaining relations with Osceola's
customers. 6 Unlike the male salaried employees, Ms. Rabidue did
not receive the "perks" associated with her position. Her supervisor
refused to let her take customers to lunch, the normal procedure
for credit managers, because "it would be improper for a woman
to take a man to lunch." He also told a co-employee that "Vivienne
is doing a good job as credit manager, but we really need a man
on that job because she can't take customers to lunch." Further-
more, Ms. Rabidue's employer perceived her as extremely willful
84. Penelope, supra note 79, at 386.
85. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J. dissenting).
86. Id. at 624.
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and abrasive and continually told her to "tone down" what he per-
ceived as her irascible and aggressive personality.
7
Prior to and throughout the time Ms. Rabidue was employed,
she and the other female employees were exposed daily to displays
of nude or partially-clad women in common work areas of the plant.8
One poster, which remained on the wall for eight years, showed a
prone woman who had a golf ball on her breasts with a man standing
over her, golf club in hand, yelling "fore". 8 9 A co-worker, the su-
pervisor of the computer division, regularly spewed anti-female ob-
scenities. He referred to women as "whores," "cunts," "pussy,"
and "tits." He specifically used these terms to describe Ms. Rabidue
and had remarked that "all that bitch needs is a good lay." 90 In
addition, he routinely refused to follow the directives issued by Ms.
Rabidue as office manager and directed other employees to ignore
the procedures she set.9' When Ms. Rabidue filed written complaints
to management about this behavior on behalf of herself and other
female employees, who feared losing their jobs if they complained
directly, the Osceola vice-president did not reprimand or fire the
man, because the company needed his computer expertise.9 2 In re-
sponse to subsequent complaints, another supervisor gave him a
"little fatherly advice," warning him that his conduct was not ap-
propriate if he yearned to become "an executive-type person.
'93
After seven years as office manager and credit manager, Ms.
Rabidue was discharged from her job as a result of her "opinionated
personality and her inability to work harmoniously with co-workers
and customers." In dismissing Ms. Rabidue's Title VII offensive
work environment sexual harassment action, the court applied the
standard of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar environ-
ment. 94 The court further determined that proper assessment of the
87. Id.
88. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615.





94. Id. at 620.
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employment environment would include consideration of the back-
ground and experience of not only the plaintiff, but also her co-
workers and supervisors, and what the plaintiff's expectations were
upon voluntarily entering the environment. 95
The dissenting judge in this case felt the reasonable person stan-
dard failed to account for the wide divergence between most wom-
en's views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men. He
suggested that "unless the outlook of the reasonable woman is
adopted the defendants as well as the courts are permitted to sustain
ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders,
in this case men." 96 His opinion also questioned the criteria the court
considered pertinent in assessing the employment environment, stat-
ing that "the majority suggests through these factors that a woman
assumes the risk of working in an abusive anti-female environment.
Moreover the majority contends that such work environments some-
how have an innate right to perpetuation and are not to be addressed
by Title VII.''97
Here, at last, appears some recognition of a reasonable woman!
True, it is a lone dissent in what must be thousands of court de-
cisions reported in 1986. Still, the nature and the quality of Judge
Keith's opinion reflect not just the words "reasonable woman," but
also the concerns of women silenced and alienated by the language
of the law. As the voices of women are heard in courts across the
country, man-made language will be less able to deny the reasonable
woman (or unreasonable women!!!).
95. Id.
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POST SCRIPT
In this paper I have evaded the heart of feminist linguistic theory
[perhaps of all feminist theory] by avoiding a confrontation with
male/female duality recurrent in patriarchal thinking.









the semiotics of the ideologies
of our historical moment"
[why not just say, the symbols of our current beliefs?]
My understanding must come from outside the theoretical
my sense of feminism demands this
Not only is the personal political
the political, the theoretical is personal
Somewhere in my gut!
I'll know
Yet the words are attractive/beckoning
I go further/searching
for coherence/understanding. If language is inherently patriarchal
are we doomed
forever
to relive the oppression of our mothers?
If it is not
why is it so difficult to speak?
or hear?
Why do I always come back to
either/or
male/female
Is the split inevitable?
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Is all thought binary?
[I responded positively to Levi-Strauss when I read his works for
Legal Anthropology. Maybe the binary oppositions felt right in my
gut; maybe it was because he talked about cooking instead of fight-
ing.]
If so
Is binary thought inherently
phallocentric?







binary values? What about the
that binary thought
is carefully taught









in passive non-violent resistance
hot/cold
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I had started up a spiral staircase
understanding evolved
in ascending circles one foot always
on the last rung,
a question
the next step









constrained by an appreciation of grey
Reformism is simple-minded.
Radical theory is obtuse.
Is this an inkling
of the "female voice"
Certainly not
a retreat to biological determinism





Consciousness of the Power
of the Word
to transform
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